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1. Introduction 
We often find ourselves in a predicament. On the one hand, we find it congenial to talk 
about things of various sorts: the hole in the cheese, the number of planets, the property shared 
by all spiders, the possible worlds at which things are different, and so on and so forth. But 
on the other hand, we find it difficult to accept that there really are such things. For these 
things are troublesome: they offend our taste for desert landscapes and raise difficult 
questions about how we could know about them. So we are presented with a dilemma: 
either we give up our ontological scruples and embrace the existence of troublesome 
entities, or we reject their existence and revise our linguistic practices.  
 Fictionalists hope that we can have our cake and eat it, that our linguistic practices 
can be reconciled with our ontological scruples. After all, the things we say in the context of 
our engagement with fiction provides a paradigm case where we do not find it so 
problematic to talk about entities in whose existence we do not believe: we often say things 
like “some elves are nimble” or “Holmes is a detective” even though we do not believe that 
there really are elves or a brilliant detective living at 221b Baker Street. So perhaps our talk 
of fictional things can be used as a model for understanding our talk of troubling entities, 
and thereby a way of talking with the vulgar but thinking with the wise. Such fictionalist 
proposals are common, having been offered in the case of mathematical objects (Field 1980, 
1989), unobservable entities (van Fraassen 1980), possible worlds (Rosen 1990), composite 
objects (Rosen and Dorr 2002), fictional characters (Brock 2002), scientific models (Frigg 
2010), propositions (Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2010), colours (Gatzia 2010) and 
beyond.  
 This conception of the fictionalist’s project is broad and irenic, picking out a genus of 
which there are various species, and the more specific content of a fictionalist proposal will 
vary depending on exactly how the basic idea is fleshed out. Here, we provide an overview 
of what we take to be the core choice points facing the fictionalist, as well as a survey of 
some of the main issues facing the viability of fictionalist strategies.  
 
2. The Analogy with Fiction 
The term “fictionalism” and its cognates are used widely and wildly in the literature, and 
one would be forgiven for thinking that “fictionalism” is nothing more than a term of 
philosophical fashion, with nothing unifying the various proposals that have been given the 
label. For our part, we think that the most minimal and inclusive conception of fictionalism 
takes fictionalists about a given discourse — talk of numbers, or talk of properties, etc. — to 
accept something like the following (for alternative attempts to characterize fictionalism see 
e.g. Kroon (2011: §2), Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2015: Ch.1)):  
 
The Analogy 
The target discourse can usefully be interpreted by analogy with a natural way of 
interpreting paradigmatically fictional discourse, and the ensuing account of the 
target discourse supports an anti-realist account of its apparent subject matter.  
 
To see the import of The Analogy, consider its application to a particular case. So, e.g., 
mathematical fictionalists emerge as holding that the sentences of mathematical talk should 
be interpreted by analogy with a natural way of interpreting sentences like ‘most elves are 
nimble’ and that the ensuing account of mathematics supports an account of the apparent 
subject matter of mathematical talk — numbers, sets, functions, etc. — that is anti-realistic 
in character. A number of points merit attention. 
 
 
 Firstly, the fictionalist tells us only how mathematical talk can usefully be understood. 
Her claim is thus distinct both from the more straightforwardly descriptive claim that do in 
fact understand mathematics along fictionalist lines as well as from the more 
straightforwardly normative claim that we should do so. Accordingly, the fictionalist’s 
project is neither ‘hermeneutic’ nor ‘revolutionary’ to use some jargon that has become 
popular in the literature (see Stanley 2001, for the origins of the distinction see Burgess 1983, 
and Burgess and Rosen 1997). Both the hermeneut and the revolutionary agree that we can 
and should be fictionalists; they disagree on whether we are. The Analogy is endorsed by 
both hermeneuts and revolutionaries, and the core elements of a fictionalist proposal can be 
enriched in either direction. Indeed, fictionalism could be developed in neither direction, 
for the distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary ficitonalisms is not an exhaustive 
one: for instance, van Fraassen’s claim in the case of defending his fictionalist account of 
unobservables is not that his approach is not that scientists are fictionalists, nor that scientists 
should be fictionalists, but rather that scientists can be fictionalists (see Van Fraassen 1980, 
1994; Rosen 1994). It is for this reason that we chose not to build a stronger descriptive or 
normative element into our formulation of The Analogy. 
 Secondly, what’s important is ‘paradigmatically’ fictional discourse. It’s familiar that 
our engagement with fiction is multi-faceted. We have authors who create, audiences who 
consume, critics who analyze, and so on. The distinctions here are not clean cut, but different 
things still seem to be going on in each case. What’s relevant to fictionalism, at least as we 
understand it, is the type of fictional discourse that is exemplified when someone is talking 
to you about The Hobbit and tells you that some elves are nimble. In this setting, it is 
consumers of fiction rather than authors or critics who serve as the paradigm. Our use of 
‘talk of fiction’ and ‘fictional discourse’ should be understood in this light.  
 Thirdly, the proposed analogy isn’t between the target discourse and fictional 
discourse, but the target discourse and a ‘natural interpretation’ of fictional discourse. Not 
only does this leave it open whether the natural interpretation is the right one, it’s also 
consistent with there being various equally natural interpretations of fictional discourse and 
two fictionalists might disagree about which of these is relevant to the proposed analogy. 
In any case, we stress that it isn’t built into fictionalism that what’s going on when we say 
things about numbers (e.g.) is continuous with what’s going on when we say things about 
elves. It might be odd to be a fictionalist (and hence an anti-realist) about, say, numbers 
while being a realist about fictional characters (by regarding them as, say, abstract artifacts) 
but such combinations of views shouldn’t be ruled out by fiat, and the analogy is formulated 
to avoid doing just that: you can still regard an anti-realistic interpretation of talk about 
elves as natural, even if you don't think it is the view to be adopted all-things-considered. 
Moreover, even once the fictionalist has settled upon a particular basis for the analogy, 
we’ve yet to be told how tight it is meant to be. For instance, is the analogy with fiction just 
meant to remind us that we can use sentences without committing ourselves to the entities 
we seem to be talking about? Or is some richer analogy with fiction intended? If so, what is 
it and what purposes does it serve? 
   Finally, even once we’ve settled both the nature and tightness of the analogy, the 
account of mathematical talk that the fictionalist hopes to build on these foundations is only 
meant to support an anti-realist account of the ‘apparent’ subject matter of mathematics, 
and that’s consistent with the claim that the real subject matter of mathematics is number 
free. Indeed, some fictionalists have argued that the ‘real’ subject matter of the target 
discourse is not the subject matter that one might initially identify (see Yablo 2001, who 
suggests that the real subject matter of a claim like “the number of planets is eight” only 
concerns planets rather than numbers too).  At least in these ways, then, endorsing The Analogy is the start of the story rather 
than the end of it. That’s to say that the fictionalist has choices, and that more specific 
proposals can be delineated in terms of how these choices are made. One upshot is that the 
commitments of fictionalism, as well as its benefits and problems, will vary depending upon 
the exact nature of the proposal at hand. For the purposes of this survey, however, we 
choose to focus on issues that we think arise for a great many (if not all) fictionalist strategies.  
 
 
3. Fictionalist Paraphrases  
Given that the core element of a fictionalist proposal is captured by a claim as weak as The 
Analogy it’s unsurprising to learn that fictionalists disagree about how the approach should 
be cashed out and thereby about how fictionalism is best developed. Be that as it may, we 
can identify one core idea that is often found in textbook presentations of fictionalism: the 
importance of what we will call fictionalist paraphrases. A fictionalist paraphrase in the 
intended sense is simply a mapping from sentences that concern troubling entities to 
sentences that concern the content of a fiction. Some examples: Field (1980) paraphrases the 
claim that there are prime numbers as: it is true according to standard arithmetic that prime 
numbers exist; Rosen (1990) paraphrases the claim that there are possible worlds as: it is true 
according to modal realism that possible worlds exist; Brock (2002) paraphrases the claim that 
fictional characters exist as: it is true according to fictional realism that fictional characters exist; 
and Cian Dorr (2005) paraphrases the claim that tables exist as: it is true according to 
universalism that tables exist.  
 What we have in each case, then, is a mapping from sentences which seemingly can 
only be true if reality contains certain things to sentences which seemingly can be true even 
if reality lacks those very things. For even if reality lets us down and fails to contain things 
like numbers or tables or fictional characters, it can still be true that such things exist 
according to certain theories. For it is well known that story-operators are non-factive in the 
sense that p’s being true according to some fiction or theory doesn’t entail that p is true tout 
court. It would be madness to think we can infer that there really are elves from the fact that 
it is true according to The Hobbit that elves exist. Moreover, insofar as these kinds of ‘theory-
shadowing’ paraphrases are distinctive of fictionalist proposals, they help to see the 
appropriateness of the label ‘fictionalism’ — after all, it is natural to think everyday 
utterances of sentences like “there are elves” are acceptable (perhaps even true) because in 
the relevant contexts those sentences are best interpreted as concerning what is true 
according to some salient work of fiction.  
 But even though the appeal to theory-shadowing paraphrases is distinctive of 
fictionalist proposals, the more interesting issue concerns not their presence but their 
purpose and significance. Indeed, the species of fictionalism can be demarcated, at least in 
part, precisely in terms of the respective theoretical roles that each associates with 
fictionalist paraphrases.  
 The main choice point facing the fictionalist can be illustrated nicely by analogy with 
the things we say about fictional characters, events and places. Suppose that Alice and Billy 
are discussing The Lord of the Rings and Alice claims that some elves are nimble. Despite the 
fact that there are no such creatures as elves, there is a natural sense in which Alice’s claim 
is correct because it is true according to Tolkien’s story that there are such creatures and that 
some of them are nimble. Indeed, given the topic of their conversation, it would seemingly 
be incorrect for Alice to claim that no elves are nimble. For despite the fact that there are no 
such creatures as elves (and hence, that none of them are nimble), such a claim seems 
incorrect because it is false according to Tolkien’s story that no elves are nimble. The facts 
about what is and isn’t true according to some relevant story thus often seem to determine 
whether or not the things we say about fictional character are appropriate (correct) or 
inappropriate (incorrect). But whilst this observation is common ground in the debate, the 
crucial question concerns whether the relevant standard of correctness is distinct from truth. 
And here we are drawn in two competing directions. On the one hand, the fact that there 
are no such creatures as elves strongly suggests that Alice spoke falsely when he she claimed 
that some elves are nimble. But on the other hand, the fact that she and Billy were discussing 
the goings-on in The Lord of the Rings tempts us to hold that Alice spoke truly because what 
she meant was that it is fictional that some elves are nimble. Hence, on the first proposal, 
Alice spoke falsely but correctly, whereas on the second proposal, she spoke correctly 
because she spoke truly.  
 We can accordingly distinguish two fictionalist strategies, based on two alternative 
conceptions of the role of fictionalist paraphrases. On the first proposal, the fictionalist about 
unobservable entities thinks that sentences like “there are electrons” are false but 
 
 
nonetheless appropriate or correct because it is true according to standard physics that there 
are such things, and the mathematical fictionalist thinks that sentences like “there are 
functions” are false but nonetheless appropriate because it is true according to standard 
maths that there are such things. We call this view committal fictionalism because the 
fictionalist who pursues this option thinks of sentences like “there are electrons” or “there 
are functions” as being ontologically committed to electrons or functions insofar as their truth 
requires the existence of such things. Indeed, it’s precisely the fact that this requirement is 
not met — or so the fictionalist thinks — that explains why the committal fictionalist does 
not accept that these sentences are true.  
 On the second proposal, by contrast, the fictionalist thinks that the things we 
ordinarily think and say are not only correct but true because what is really meant by 
sentences like “there are electrons” or “there are functions” is that it is true according to 
standard physics that there are electrons or true according to standard maths that there are 
functions. We call this view non-committal fictionalism because the fictionalist who pursues 
this option thinks of sentences like “there are electrons” or “there are functions” as being 
ontologically innocent insofar as their truth does not require the existence of such things and 
instead requires that it is merely fictional that there are such things. Indeed, it’s precisely 
the fact that this requirement is met — it is fictional that there are such things — that explains 
why the non-committal fictionalist accepts that these sentences are true.  
 Moreover, though we have distinguished these two proposals in broadly semantic 
terms, i.e. in terms of whether or not the things we ordinarily think and say are true, the 
committal and non-committal fictionalist will have correspondingly different accounts of 
other aspects of our linguistic practices. For instance, the non-committal fictionalist can 
straightforwardly accept that the speech acts that we perform when we say things about 
electrons and functions are assertions that are judged to be correct or incorrect depending 
on whether or not what is asserted is true: it’s just that such a fictionalist appeals to 
fictionalist paraphrases to specify the content of what is asserted. And similarly, the non-
committal fictionalist can also allow that we express beliefs when we say that there are 
electrons or functions: it’s just that she appeals to her paraphrases to specify the content of 
what is believed. By contrast, the non-committal fictionalist cannot straightforwardly accept 
that we are making assertions or expressing beliefs, since on her view we speak falsely when 
we say things like “there are electrons” or “there are functions”. Accordingly, the non-
committal fictionalist will instead see us as performing a speech act that is distinct from 
assertion (typical called quasi-assertion or pretend assertion) and as expressing a mental 
attitude that is distinct from belief (typically called acceptance).  
 
4. Objections to Fictionalism 
There is no shortage of objections to fictionalist approaches in metaphysics. But many of 
these objections only arise for more precise species of fictionalism and do not thereby 
threaten to establish that the genus is somehow problematic in a more global way. For 
instance, some have thought that mathematical fictionalism is empirically wrong given that 
young children who suffer from autism generally find it difficult to engage in pretence but 
do not generally find it difficult to learn mathematics (see Stanley 2001, for discussion see 
Liggins 2010, Kim 2014). But obviously this worry only arises for fictionalists who both make 
pretence a central aspect of their account and also claim their account to be descriptively 
adequate. Similarly, some have thought that the fictionalists face a problem accounting for 
the ontology of fictions (see Nolan 1997): but even if we grant that fictions are abstract 
objects of some kind (sets of propositions, say), this worry will only arise with respect to 
fictionalists strategies focused on avoiding commitment to abstracta: no immediate worry 
arises with respect to fictionalist strategies focused on avoiding commitment to, for instance, 
composite objects or concrete possible worlds. 
 Given our focus on the features of fictionalism in general, then, we focus instead on 
objections that we think are more global, affecting many (if not all) fictionalist strategies. In 
particular, and continuing our emphasis on the role of fictionalist paraphrases, we will focus 
on two objections that arise due to specific fictionalist paraphrases that the fictionalist seems 
 
 
forced to accept. Both of these objections first arose with respect to the fictionalist account 
of possible worlds bruited by Rosen (1990), and we will present them in that context.  
 
4.1. The Incompleteness Objection  
To begin, it is worth noting that though Rosen calls his account “modal fictionalism”, this is 
a misnomer: his target is to develop a fictionalist account of possible worlds rather than a 
fictionalist account of modality itself. Rosen’s fictionalist does not deny that some things are 
really possible — just that there really are other worlds at which these possibilities are 
realized. Hence, whereas other philosophers endorse biconditionals such as It is possible for 
there to be blue swans just in case there is a possible world where swans are blue, Rosen’s fictionalist 
instead endorses biconditionals like: it is possible for there to be blue swans just in case according 
to the fiction of possible worlds, there is a possible world where swans are blue. The distinctively 
fictionalist element is then that sentences such as “there is a possible world where swans are 
blue” can nonetheless be regarded as correct (and perhaps even true) because they can be 
understood as being elliptical for their fictionalist paraphrases.  
 However, ordinary fictions are incomplete. While we learn that Patrick Bateman has 
a worrying obsession with the aesthetic qualities of business cards, we do not learn what 
his favourite colour is. Thus, it would be wrong to say that, according to American Psycho, 
Bateman’s favourite colour is blue. But it’d be equally wrong to say that, according to 
American Psycho, it’s not the case that Batemen’s favourite colour is blue. The story is simply 
silent on the issue. Now, if the fictionalist’s chosen story is incomplete in the way that 
ordinary fictions are, trouble arises. For suppose that there is some claim Q* about possible 
worlds such that neither Q* nor its negation is true according to the fictionalist’s story. 
(Rosen’s specific example of such a claim is there is world containing k-many objects, where k 
is some suitably large infinite cardinal.) Calling that story Modal Realism, we thus have  
 
 (1) It is not the case that according to Modal Realism, Q* 
 (2) It is not the case that according to Modal Realism, not-Q* 
 
But remember that the modal fictionalist thinks that claims about the content of Modal 
Realism are systematically linked to underlying facts about possibility and necessity, as 
illustrated by her endorsement of biconditionals like: it is possible for there to be blue 
swans just in case according to the fiction of possible worlds, there is a possible world 
where swans are blue. But now let Q be the modal claim corresponding to the claim about 
Modal Realism negated in (1) and not-Q be the modal claiming corresponding to the claim 
about Modal Realism negated in (2). (Rosen’s specific examples of such claims are it is 
possible for there to be k-many objects and it is not possible for there to be k-many objects.) And 
recall that the fictionalist seems committed to endorsing the following two claims:  
 
 (3) Q just in case according to Modal Realism, Q* 
 (4) not-Q just in case according to Modal Realism, not-Q*  
 
But now disaster follows since the fictionalist is committed to a flat-out contradiction: (1) 
and (3) commit the fictionalist to endorsing that it is not the case that Q whereas (2) and (4) 
commit the fictionalist to endorsing the negation of that very claim. Moreover, though the 
objection first arose with respect to modal fictionalism, it is not confined to that case. For 
example, mathematical fictionalists will face it too, when basing their fictionalism on a 
mathematical theory that is silent on certain relevant mathematical claims like the axiom of 
choice (Woodward 2012). Likewise, compositional fictionalists will face it when basing their 
fictionalism on a composition principle that allows for a certain kind of incompleteness 
(Skiba 2017). 
 We distinguish two kinds of response to the incompleteness objection. On the one 
hand, the fictionalist might grant that her story is incomplete — that is, grant the conjunction 
of (1) and (2) — but deny that contradiction follows. One strategy for doing so, initially 
suggested by Rosen but developed in more detail by Nolan (2011), does so by rejecting the 
 
 
application of the fictionalist’s schemata (3) and (4) in cases where the fiction is incomplete, 
the idea being that when the fiction is incomplete with respect to some claim about worlds, 
the corresponding modal claims are neither true nor false. The most obvious problem with 
this suggestion is that it is ad hoc: the only reason that the fictionalist has for thinking that 
the relevant modal claims are truth-valueless is to fix a structural problem in her own 
theory. Absent independent motivation, the response smacks of desperation (see Rosen 
1990, Woodward 2012). And alternative version of this strategy, suggested by Skiba 2017, 
accepts the incompleteness of the fiction but denies contradiction follows by holding that 
the apparently contradictory commitment is not actually a contradiction because, in context, 
Q and not-Q expresses the consistent claim more perspicuously captured by the conjunction 
of (1) and (2).  
 On the other hand, the fictionalist might apply her schemata across the board but 
deny that contradiction follows by denying that her fiction is incomplete (see Fine (2003), 
Brogaard (2006), Nolan (2011)). For remember that the fictionalist is not a fictionalist about 
modality itself — her fictionalism concerns the existence of possible worlds, not the facts of 
possibility and necessity. So, for any modal claim, either that claim is true or it is not; in 
particular, either the modal claim Q is the case or its negation is. The subsequent idea is to 
use the modal facts themselves to generate the content of the fiction: if Q holds, then let Q* 
be fictionally true, and if not-Q holds, let not-Q* be fictionally true. One cost of this strategy 
is that any ambition to provide a reductive analysis of modality has to be given up, but this 
was unlikely to work anyway (see Nolan 1997 and section 5 below). Moreover, it is not clear 
how this solution can be extended to fictionalisms other than modal fictionalism (see Skiba 
2017). And alternative version of this strategy, suggested by Woodward 2012, holds that the 
conjunction of (1) and (2) should be rejected because of how truth according to fiction works 
within the context of fictionalist strategies: given that according to the fiction, P is analysed in 
terms of the counterfactual conditional, P would have been true had the fiction been true, the 
fictionalist can motivate rejecting the conjunction of (1) and (2) on the grounds that it is a 
general structural feature of counterfactuals that, for any antecedent A and any consequent 
C, either the counterfactual A would C is true or the counterfactual A would not-C is true.  
 
4.2 The Brock-Rosen Objection   
Just like the Incompleteness Problem, the Brock-Rosen objection first arose in the context of 
modal fictionalism (Brock 1993, Rosen 1993). It begins by noting that, since the modal realist 
conceives of the existence of many worlds as necessary rather than contingent, the 
fictionalist seems committed to endorsing the following claim:  
 
(BR1) According to Modal Realism, at every world, there are many worlds. 
 
But again, the fictionalist’s proposal is that the facts about the content of Modal Realism are 
systematically linked to underlying modal facts. That is, we have:  
 
 (BR2) Necessarily, there are many worlds just in case according to Modal Realism, 
at every world, there are many worlds. 
 
But now disaster follows. For (BR1) and (BR2) together entail that it is necessary that there 
are many worlds. Moreover, since the fictionalist is not a fictionalist about modality, she 
seems forced to accept that it is strictly and literally true that it is necessary that there are 
many worlds. But given that necessity implies truth, the fictionalist seems committed to 
endorsing that it is strictly and literally true that there are many worlds — which is rather 
unfortunate given that the entire point of modal fictionalism was to avoid this commitment. 
Again, the Brock-Rosen objection is not confined to modal fictionalism. Nolan and 
Hawthorne (1996) observe that, just like modal operators can be applied to statements about 
worlds, so numerical operators can be applied to statements about mathematical entities. 
By reasoning similar to the above, they show how mathematical fictionalists are forced to 
 
 
accept that it is strictly and literally true that there is at least one number (see also Yablo 
2001).  
 As before, we distinguish two strategies of response available to the fictionalist. On 
the one hand, she might reject the initial premise of the Brock-Rosen objection, (BR1). The 
idea here is to be careful about exactly what it means to say, within the context of modal 
realism, that there are many worlds ‘at’ every world: for instance, swans exist ‘at’ our world 
because they are part of our world, but one might think that other worlds don’t exist ‘at’ our 
world because they are not part of our world (see Noonan 1994 and Rosen 1995, building 
on Lewis 1968, for an alternative see Kim 2002 building on Bricker 2001). The most obvious 
problem here is that there is surely some sense in which the modal realist thinks that the 
existence of many worlds is necessary rather than contingent, which is what (BR1) was 
meant to express: the architect of modal realism, David Lewis, was after all explicit on the 
point (see Lewis 1986, p. 80; compare Divers 1999a). Whatever that sense is, then, there 
seems to be some sense in which the fictionalist is committed to endorsing (BR1) and thereby 
some sense in which she is committed to embracing the existence of many worlds.  
 On the other hand, the fictionalist might grant the initial premise of the Brock-Rosen 
objection, but deny the apparently ensuing commitment to the existence of other worlds. 
One version of this strategy has is that the relevant application of the fictionalist’s general 
account, i.e. (BR2), applies in this case since it only applies to modal claims about ordinary 
objects rather than modal claims about possible worlds (see Nolan and Hawthorne 1996). 
And alternative strategy, suggested by Liggins 2008 and Woodward 2008, grants the 
premises of the Brock-Rosen objection but denies that the conclusion that follows is fatal to 
the fictionalist’s project. The idea here is that the apparently fatal commitment is not actually 
a problem because, in context, there are many worlds expresses the innocent claim more 
perspicuously captured by (BR1). 
 
 
5. The Benefits of Fictionalism 
Suppose that all of the structural and technical problems that the fictionalist faces can be 
addressed. This would seem to put the fictionalist in a strong position to argue that her 
approach was preferable to alternative proposals since she could now argue that she has 
earnt the right to speak about troublesome things like possible worlds without thereby 
being forced to accept that there really are any such things. Appearances, however, can be 
misleading. For even if the fictionalist’s theory is more parsimonious than its rivals, it 
remains to be seen whether or not fictionalism is the best overall approach. Put otherwise: 
even if fictionalist is significantly cheaper than its rivals, those other theories may have 
benefits that outweigh the extra commitments that they enforce upon us. Indeed, the kind of 
fictionalist account of talk of possible worlds that we have been considering is directly 
conceived as an answer to Lewis’s (1986) challenge to deliver “paradise on the cheap” — an 
account of possible worlds that delivers the benefits of his own theory in a theoretically less 
costly manner.  
 Whilst the fact that the subsequent literature has focused largely on the “costs” side 
of the equation is understandable, it has encouraged a somewhat laissez faire attitude to the 
benefits associated with fictionalism. Rosen, for instance, tells us that fictionalists “can have 
all the benefits of talking about possible worlds without the ontological costs” — but tell us 
neither which benefits he has in mind nor why exactly the fictionalist is in a position to enjoy 
them (see also Sider 2002). Even putting aside the controversies surrounding the question 
of whether Lewis’s theory really does deliver the benefits he claims, this is particularly 
problematical since some benefits that Lewis claims his theory delivers can quite obviously 
not be enjoyed by the fictionalist. For instance, one of the explanatory benefits Lewis claims 
of his theory is its ability to provide identifications of various kinds of entities with 
constructions out of possible worlds: thus propositions are identified with sets of possible 
worlds and properties are identified with sets of possible individuals (1986: §§ 1.4, 1.5). But 
all hands agree that it is a requirement on the success of these identifications that there is a 
plurality of possible worlds beyond the actual world and a plurality of possible individuals 
 
 
beyond the actual ones. And since the fictionalist cannot accept these commitments, at least 
some of the benefits of Lewis’s theory are quite clearly off-limits to the fictionalist (compare 
Divers 2002).  
 Matters are more vexed with respect to the other benefits which Lewis associates 
with his theory, however, and here will we focus on two such benefits: the conceptual benefit 
of providing a reduction of modal concepts to non-modal concepts, and the inferential 
benefit of providing a first-order method of assessing the validity of modal arguments. We 
focus on these benefits not only because of their prominence in the relevant debate but also 
because they illustrate the ways in which different issues facing the fictionalist interact with 
each other. In particular, there is reason to think that she cannot simultaneously enjoy the 
conceptual and inferential benefits associated with Lewis theory.  
 Lewis claims that his theory provides a distinctive explanatory benefit: a reduction 
of modal concepts to non-modal ones. For instance, the concept of possibility is reduced to 
the concept of truth at some world, which Lewis argues can be understood non-modally 
within the context of his theory. Lewis claims that other modal concepts can be understood 
non-modally: necessity reduces to truth at all worlds, contingency to truth at some but not 
all worlds, impossibility to truth at no world, and that even more complex modal concepts 
like counterfactual dependence and supervenience can also be analysed non-modally (see 
Lewis 1986, and Divers 2002 for discussion).  
 Now, recall that whereas Lewis’s account is built around schemata like Possibly P iff 
P is true at some world, the fictionalist’s account is built around schemata like Possibly P iff it 
is fictional that P is true at some world. Accordingly, even if we grant that the concepts that 
figure in Lewis’s analysis are non-modal in character, an extra concept appears in the  
fictionalist’s analysis, viz. the concept of fictionality or truth according to a theory. The question 
of whether the fictionalist’s analysis is genuinely non-modal, then, turns on the question of 
whether the concept of fictionality is non-modal. And as Rosen himself notes, the prospects 
of providing a non-modal analysis of fictionality do not seem to be very good since there is 
an intuitive connection between a proposition p being true according to a fiction and the 
truth of the various modal claims like “the fiction necessitates p” and “p would have been 
true had the fiction been true” (cf. Divers 1999b, Dorr 2005, Woodward 2010). But the 
fictionalist cannot understand fictionality in either of these ways without compromising any 
ambition she has to deliver a non-modal analysis of modal concepts. Rosen’s official reply 
is to reject any analysis of fictionality in modal terms and indeed take the notion of truth 
according a theory as a primitive. The most immediate problem here is that the concept of 
fictionality doesn’t look like a particularly good one to take as primitive: it is a concept that 
stands in need of explication rather than one in terms of which other concepts are explicated. 
A less immediate, but in our view equally pressing problem, is that there are reasons to 
think that the fictionalist should understand the concept of fictionality in modal terms. 
Illustrating this point, however, requires us to look at a different kind of benefit associated 
with talking about possible worlds.  
 Talking about possible worlds is often thought to be beneficial insofar as doing so 
provides a first-order method of assessing the validity of modal arguments: on a possible 
worlds analysis, the validity of the argument from necessarily p to possibly p is explained  
since it is understood as the argument from p is true at all worlds to p is true at some world 
which is just a simple case of universal instantiation. There are obvious reasons why making 
these transitions is often called the practice of ‘doing modal logic by proxy’. For rather than 
assessing the validity of modal arguments by relying on the inference rules of a particular 
modal logic, we rely instead on the inference rules of (non-modal) first-order logic. The 
language of first-order logic thus provides a proxy language for the language of modal logic. 
And the main motivation for doing modal logic by proxy – indeed, the main reason why 
the practice is considered to be beneficial – is that the practice is inferentially economical in 
the sense that the set of inference rules in the proxy language is smaller than the set of 
inference rules in the modal language. (Compare the discussion of the inferential benefits of 
mathematics in Field (1980), whereby the main benefit associated with talk of numbers is its 
ability to make our inferential lives easier.) 
 
 
 But, as Divers (1999b) observes, it appears that the fictionalist can justify the practice 
of doing modal logic by proxy if and only if she can justify her acceptance of the following 
Safety Result (SR): 
 
 (SR) Necessarily, if B* is a consequence of A*, then B is a consequence of A  
 
(where A and B are modal claims are their starred counterparts are their respective possible-
world paraphrases). Divers goes on to argue that the fictionalist can establish the safety 
result — and hence can deliver the inferential benefits associated with talking about possible 
worlds — but in doing so analyses the concept of fictionality in modal terms. And though 
the specific analysis Divers uses, whereby according to the fiction, p becomes the fiction 
necessitates p, is not needed — Woodward (2010) shows how the safety result can be 
established given a counterfactual analysis of fictionality — the point emerges that whilst 
the fictionalist can enjoy the inferential benefits associated with talk of possible worlds, 
doing so seemingly requires her to understand the concept of fictionality in modal terms, 
and thereby admit that she cannot provide a thoroughly non-modal analysis of modal 
concepts. (A further potential cost of establishing (SR) with the help of the modal analysis 
of the fiction-operator is that she has to regard her fiction as merely contingently false, see 
Skiba (forthcoming) for an attempt to avoid this.)  
 The case of the modal fictionalist, then, provides a nice case study not only of the 
structural and technical difficulties that fictionalist strategies in metaphysics must 
overcome, but also of the problems that proponents of such strategies face when it comes to 
delivering the same range of explanatory benefits as are offered by alternative approaches. 
Moreover, it illustrates the interplay between the choices that the fictionalist makes in 
constructing her account and the overall assessing of a specific fictionalist proposal in terms 
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